In the past few days, there have been massive demonstrations and protests in Iran (incl. my hometown(s)) that have been perceived as ‘anti-regime’ protests by many worldwide. I come from different ethnic and lingual backgrounds, and I have connections in the capital, as well as the provinces where these protests have been taking place. I have communicated with people in different regions, including the capital city Tehran, as well as other cities that witnessed protests. I did not get ‘surprised’ by the incidents. You can hear people talk about issues such as unemployment, late or unpaid salaries, corruption, etc. everywhere in Iran, even in public spaces such as buses and on the streets. These issues are not new, neither is the people’s frustration.
I did, however, get surprised by the sudden eruption of the protests, but that could be because I have been away from the country, and I heard about it on the news which was a strange feeling. I did, however, get surprised by some reactions in the Western Media (I was following the channels that my hotel made available for me such as Euronews, BBC, DW, VOA, etc. as well Iranian internet media forums and the social media – since I was traveling) and their interpretations of the events. One of these channels (my memory fails to remember which) talked about people’s demand to re-establish the pre-Islamic Revolution monarchy system (Pahlavi that is) which I found misleading, since this has been a very marginal viewpoint in the protests. The immediate jumping on the ‘overthrowing the regime’ narrative was also something that I saw mostly on social media of Iranian diasporic groups or other Western channels but did not hear about from my contacts who were in Iran. I was of course saddened and infuriated by the violence and loss of lives, and have been trying to inform myself on what ‘really’ is going on since I heard the news.
Here is what I think so far:
Different waves and different strata of the larger Iranian community are taking part in these protests for many different reasons. I find it simplistic and rather reductionist to label these protests merely anti-regime, or view their motivations as only economic or political. However, the significance of the onset of the protests among the provincial and peripheral populations in Iran should not be taken lightly.
A lot of issues played a role in this wave of protests. These protests followed some financial and credit institutions’ bankruptcy that deprived many people of their savings. The prices of goods and services in Iran have been skyrocketing, partly because of long-standing US and EU sanctions on Iran that the country has been struggling with. The poor worker’s rights and the fact that many workers have not been paid salaries for months, as well as poor safety work conditions for workers that were especially highlighted in several workplace accidents (ex. the recent mine accident that claimed lives of workers) have all added up to the general discontent. There have also been some cases of officials’ corruption condemnations, including those of the former president’s allies (MA). These incidents were coupled with the bitter memory of the 2009 uprisings where the protesters warned that such corruption would happen. There was also news of huge budgets received by religious institutions, that President Rouhani criticized for not having enough clarity and transparency in terms of their budget usage. All these added to the preexisting discontent of minority groups, women, and the working class.
I agree with what Peyman Jafari emphasized people’s participation in the recent protests in Iran despite the high price they paid for it, and while many have been arrested or killed. The fact that despite such reaction from the state, protests persist means that people have serious demands that need to be listened to. But discussions that directly address ‘a toppling’ of the regime are not well-enough-informed about the diversity of the demands by protesting populations, and are instead [un?]intentionally adopting views similar to that of the US presidential office has. I agree with Boroujerdi in this case (find his article here). Even among the people who have anti-regime sentiments, the overthrowing of the regime in yet another revolution is not at all a popular idea. Not because of the love that all people have for the regime, but because after experiencing the 1979 revolution followed by eight years of war, most Iranians have come to prefer change as a gradual and reform-based process. I find the popular idea that regimes remain in power because people want it to remain simplistic.
Today, different groups of Iranians might not agree on the level of reforms but within the politics of the region with the emergence of extremists, and with the new US presidential office that has taken a clear side by backing Israeli and Saudi politics, many Iranians ‘know’ that a major unrest in Iran could only lead to more instability. The reactions of the politicians of these three countries (US, Israel, and KSA) to the recent unrest prove the Iranian people’s point. These reactions might be welcomed by a minority in Iran, but a majority of the population, including the protesters, categorically reject any sort of support from these states. They perceive that Trump and Netanhayu’s reactions are not friendly support messages, but a part of their wishful thinking at best.
The power struggles between the conservatives and reformers in Iran do and have affected the shaping of social and political activism in Iran. But this binary of radical/reformer that is often used to explain the politics of the country (usually from abroad) has also changed in the past decade. Reformists are separated in groups based on the levels and forms of reform they advocate, and so are the radicals on both sides. The former President Ahmadinejad’s politics that were viewed as conservative when he ran for the presidency have found their own way after the end of his presidential period. The people are also not easily dividable in these binary categories. I want to emphasize that people who have taken part in these recent protests in Iran have come from different political, economic, religious, ethnic, and social backgrounds. This binary political power relations have played a role by creating narratives of reform and dialogue on one side and constancy and stability on the other, but not ‘the’ role. Plus, I believe that these protests might further fragment these binary positions. Like what happened after the 2009 elections, by the emboldening of political groups that stood in the middle-ground and the formation of more educated and experienced reformers, and radicals.
I think an important aspect of the recent unrest in Iran, especially at its very beginning was the leadership or as some have discussed lack of it. I spoke to some informants who believed that there were no leaders behind the protests and that they were indeed spontaneous. Others referred to the worker unions and groups of labor activists as the ‘people’ behind initial peaceful protests. If the latter – and I want to speak cautiously here – then we would be able to talk about an alternative form of leadership rather than a leaderless movement; but not necessarily new since these activists and unions have long been active, and have organized protests before. But as I mentioned we are seeing participation of different fragments of the society in these protests in Iran. These fragments do not organize the same way, or using the same means and do not necessarily agree on strategies and demands either. Older groups such as the green movement might still have their own networks, news, and social media channels that they might be using. And it is unclear whether or to what extent these different groups communicate with each other.
I have read articles that compare the recent protests with the 2009 protests, and I must admit that I find it hard to compare the two movements; first, because I was a witness and close observant in the first, and now I am only getting informed through my informal and formal channels. I believe that this makes my perceptions and interpretations less exact. Second, I am still trying to make sense of the events and inform myself about what is happening in my country from afar. But overall, I think the demands of this wave of protests are more diverse, as I mentioned many groups with different political, social, and economic demands are taking part. The spontaneity of the protests is another point of difference. The students protest Iran (in the capital city mostly) that came after the provincial protests have more in common with the 2009 green movement’s motivations and demands. But the large student population in Tehran that has a long history of protests has a different composition and consequently demands from the provincial working class. What I found different in this wave of protests by the student population was the frustration with the ideas of ‘reformists’ that were central in the green movement where the protesters had a more or less homogeneous and uniform demand. This frustration came after this group’s hopes – that President Rouhani will bring about reform – are lost. This has divided the green movement to those who still believe in Rouhani, and those who don’t anymore.
What I found quite striking was the immediate ‘hijacking’ of the diverse agenda of the protests. The hijacking of agenda took place on many sides, not only by the political conservatives inside the country but by resistance diasporic groups outside the country and also Western politicians, media, and scholars who might get things wrong. The ‘overthrowing’ discourse that immediately emerged if generalized to the whole protests is one form of these hijackings. Inside the country, because of the state’s monopoly in the realm of circulation of information (whether it is through classic media or the online media), it is easy to create certain narratives that push the agenda of the power groups into the forefront, and naturalize them. I believe that Iran is not an exception in doing this. The hijacking can also take place by the radical anti-regime groups and individuals inside the country. We must understand that a large population inside the country sees burning cars and damaging public property as destructive and ineffective activities, and abstains from taking part in protests that entail such forms of ‘violence’, even though they themselves might have anti-regime sentiments. One appeal of the 2009 protests in Iran (at the very beginning) that gathered millions was the very fact that most participants agreed on the ‘peaceful’ nature of the protests.
An important factor in the formation of such radical demonstrations and protests in Iran is women’s activism. Women have been and are at the forefront of the political change and resistance in Iran. This has been so before and since the Islamic Revolution and it continues to be so today. Iranian women political activists have not only continuously raised issues of equal gender rights but also other forms of rights. Women are in my opinion the constantly running engines of the social resistance in Iran. They show their rebellion and at the same time resilience in their very everyday acts such as dressing up and occupying spaces. Women in Iran have the largest accessible potential for radical political resistance. They are deprived of their rights based on their bodies, and their gender on top of all the other intersectional identities that they [might/might not] share with other groups. This has provided them with a unique standpoint that enables them to resist, to recruit, and to act. You can see women’s presence in all forms of resistance, in arts, in literature, in political and social activism, in education, in women’s and gender struggles, in animal rights and environmental issues, etc. Women have also rejected the mainstream politics by not taking part in roles where they had to comply with traditionalism, and could not change the structures. I have personally known many Iranian women who have refused university or government positions where they thought they would not be able to ‘change’ the system, and have instead taken up economically precarious but entrepreneurial activities where they could work in a free environment and have better impact in others’ lives.
Last but not least is the importance of showing transnational solidarity with such protests. Solidarity is emphasized by feminist political scholars, and as a feminist, I find it imperative in the globalized world, if it is well-informed about the contexts and intersectional power differences. But to put it simply, if you cannot find Iran on the world map and don’t know anything about its contemporary and historical social and political struggles including Western interventions and regime change in the country’s politics, you might not be the best candidate to show solidarity with a group of people in times of crisis. Iranian diasporic populations and some Western allies in Europe have already started organizing some solidarity practices with the people inside Iran. In our region, I heard of ongoing or planned solidarity events in the Netherlands and in Belgium. In regard with the EU’s approach, I read this EU declaration. The standpoint that emphasizes the right of people to protest by leaving the dialogue channels open is probably the most beneficial for the Iranian people. On the other hand, if we do believe that an important underlying factor causing the protests in Iran was economic hardship, since EU has implemented different sanctions on Iran and Iranian nationals whether they were politically active or not, for many Iranians who have been affected by the economic, political or social consequences of these sanctions, the EU’s support of people’s right to protests in Iran might not mean a great deal.
Iranian men and women’s activism should not always be viewed within a ‘revolution for a regime change’, or ‘nothing at all’ dualism. We must listen, and consider people’s demands, just like any other people, as an ongoing complex and collective wave of demonstrating discontent in many different areas, and as people’s longing for a more democratic society.
Published by Ladan Rahbari
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